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Abstract
This research argues that in highly unequal societies, a rent-seeking and self-
maximizing dictator may be supported by a fraction of the population, despite
the absence of special benefits to these societal groups. Importantly, it is
the stakes of the dictator in the economy, in the form of capital ownership,
that drive the support of individuals. In highly unequal societies ruled by a
capital-rich dictator endowed with the power to tax and appropriate at will,
the elites will support dictatorial policies given that they can generate higher
growth rates than the ones obtained under democracy. This support arises
unconditionally to special benefits to the elites and despite the total absence
of checks and balances on the dictator.
1 Introduction
Unlike democracies, dictatorial regimes centralize the powers in the hands of a single
and often corrupt ruler, whose survival hinges on the support of particular soci-
etal groups. Accordingly, the policies implemented under dictatorships respond to
the incentives of a limited number of individuals, at the expense of the rest of the
population.
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Despite this misalignment of incentives, dictatorships have recurrently been ob-
served throughout history since the potentially dissatisfied masses often prove unable
to translate their disagreement into an effective threat to the central regime. In 2010,
one could discern 29 highly authoritarian regimes (negative polity IV score) control-
ling the lives of more than 2 billion people. Understanding the mechanisms that
explain support of societal groups for dictatorships is a challenging task.
This research argues that in highly unequal societies, a rent-seeking and self-
maximizing dictator may be supported by a fraction of the population, despite the
absence of special benefits to these societal groups. Importantly, it is the stakes of
the dictator in the economy, in the form of capital ownership, that drive the support
of individuals. In highly unequal societies ruled by a capital-rich dictator endowed
with the power to tax and appropriate at will, the elites will support dictatorial
policies given that they can generate higher growth rates than the ones obtained
under democracy. This support arises unconditionally to special benefits to the
elites and despite the total absence of checks and balances on the dictator. The
support for a dictator is decreasing with the degree of equality in the economy. As
a consquence, in mildly unequal societies dictators will adopt more popular policies
(less rent seeking and more redistribution) in order to expand their support base,
and thereby to contain the risk of transition to democracy.
To unveil the purely economic incentives associated with the support for a dicta-
torial regime, this research builds on Alesina and Rodrik’s (1994) seminal work. In
our paper democracy is modeled as in their framework. Namely, the government im-
plements the median voter’s preferred policy which can yield inefficiently low growth
rates because of the median voter’s incentives to implement an over-redistributive
policy. We amend Alesina and Rodrik’s (1994) model by grafting a self-interested
dictator who is entitled to extract any fraction of the tax proceeds he wishes.1 The
dictator then redistributes the tax proceeds net of extraction to the whole popula-
tion under the form of a productivity augmenting public good. When implementing
his policy, however, the dictator lives under a political survival constraint so that
dissatisfied citizens will contribute to the democratization of the country.
This simple framework allows for a direct comparison between democracies and
dictatorships. When self-interested dictators have strong vested interests in the coun-
try’s economy, they have incentives to stimulate the economy. This, in turn, grants
the dictator the support of a share of subjects who prefer the authoritarian option
to the alternative of a democratic polity, that delivers lower growth rates. The dic-
tator’s vested interests and the support he collects from some of his subjects are
1The rent extraction behavior of dictators has been stressed in influential works on dictatorships
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Lee 2003).
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therefore strategic complements, thus implying that more support or more capital
owned by the dictator are conducive to higher growth rates and to securing the long
run survival of dictators.
The contribution of this research lies in describing the fundamental economic
incentives behind the support for a dictatorship. We show that in societies featuring
a high concentration of capital, and provided the ruling body has high stakes in
the economy, part of the capital owners value dictatorship more than democracy.
We argue that the persistence of some dictatorships can be rooted in the substantial
backing of wealthy capital owners. Since different regimes have different implications
for growth, our work suggests that the relationship between capital distribution and
growth is both affected and affects the endogenous emergence of political institutions.
Theoretical contribution
Our study contributes to two broad research questions.
First, we enrich the literature investigating the links between political systems
and economic performance. Early on, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
Tabellini (1994) established in parallel that unequal societies may constrain eco-
nomic growth because of the median voter’s excessive willingness to redistribute
wealth through high levels of taxation when the latter is poorly endowed in capital.
These theories therefore predict that in democracies economic growth is an increas-
ing function of the median voter’s wealth levels. These models integrally focused
on democratic regimes, thus disregarding the consequences of a dictatorial rule. Ol-
son (1993) argues that long-lived dictators with vested interests in the economic
performance of the country (i.e. stationary bandits) promote economic growth com-
pared to short lived dictators (i.e. roving bandits). Building on Olson’s (1993) work,
McGuire and Olson (1997) and Niskanen (1997) compare the economic performance
of democracy and dictatorship. Both articles cast aside the question of the endoge-
nous survival of regimes, and both conclude that because of the rent-seeking activity
of the dictator, the democratic regime will always outperform the dictatorial one.
Our contribution views the survival of dictatorial regimes as an endogenous process
that depends on the citizen’s support, and the core finding of the paper points at
the growth-enhancing nature of some dictatorships. Two recent studies reach similar
conclusions to McGuire and Olson (1997) and to Niskanen (1997) even when consid-
ering benevolent autocrats (Shen 2007, Gradstein 2007). Studying elitist dictatorial
regimes, Lee (2003) shows that when higher tax rates imply lower growth rates, dic-
tatorship always produces lower economic performance than democracy. Besley and
Kudamatsu (2008) mainly focus on dictatorial regimes, but do compare democracies
to dictatorships and derive the conditions making the latter more preferable in terms
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of economic growth. Yet, in Besley and Kudamatsu (2008) democracy is conceptual-
ized as the population voting over a dictator and allowing him to appropriate public
funds, rather than having checks and balances forbidding a democratically elected
leader from acting as a bandit.
Other contributions in the literature of comparative political economy investi-
gate the impact of political institutions on public policies and economic outcomes.
Oechslin (2010) focuses on non-democratic regimes and shows that the relationship
between tax-revenues and growth may be hump-shaped. The underlying reason is
that in the presence of high governmental revenues, the viability of the regime will
be jeopardized by potential challengers, thus reducing the current government’s time
horizon and associated growth-enhancing investments. Gehlbach and Keefer (2011)
focus on institutionalized ruling parties as a commitment device used (under some
conditions) by autocrats to provide a sound economic environment for investors,
thereby reaching democracies’ levels of private investment. In comparing long run
dynamics of democracies and dictatorships, both Acemoglu (2008) and Davis (2010)
demonstrate the superiority of the former. Acemoglu (2008) studies the economic
performance of oligarchies (rule by the elite). He argues that while oligarchies may
achieve better economic growth in the short run due to a more efficient use of capi-
tal, democracies generate better economic outcomes in the long run through the free
entry of non-elite individuals into the productive class of capitalists. Davis (2010)
suggests institutional flexibility - the ability to adopt and develop new institutions -
as a key driver of long term economic growth. The flexibility of democratic decision
making sustains the evolution of institutional quality, thus allowing democracies to
outperform non-democratic regimes.2
With respect to the existing studies we analyze the individual preferences for
a political system depending on the capital distribution in the society. As in the
previous literature, we find that a dictatorship is never preferred to a democracy
for the society at large, but it grants larger payoffs for capital-rich individuals in
societies featuring enough concentration of capital. While the underlying mecha-
nism in our model may to some extent be reminiscent of Osborne and Tsyvinski’s
(1996) and of Besley and Coate’s (1997) citizen-candidate models, in our setting
individuals are faced with the choice of two different regimes. It is indeed the case
that both regimes are summarized into one growth rate, yet this growth rate comes
with different assumptions as to the structure of the economy. Citizens can either
support a democratic regime with all the checks and balances in force, or else they
2Both these contributions are compatible with the work of Aghion et al. 2008 according to
whom democracy may have a beneficial effect on the productivity and the entrepreneurship of a
country, expecially when a country’s industries are located near their technological frontier.
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can opt for a self regarding, and thus potentially corrupt, dictator. If the capital
distribution is sufficiently skewed, when the dictator proposes a ‘platform’ his choice
may be totally unconstrained: capital-rich citizens prefer backing a rent-seeking -
yet growth-friendly - dictator, instead of observing highly redistributive policies un-
der democracy. To our knowledge, this is the first study showing that a share of
the population, not benefiting from any special treatment by the dictator and not
directly involved in the regime (e.g. as clients, party members, or military bodies),
strictly prefers a rent-seeking dictator to democracy. Interestingly this result holds
despite the absence of checks and balances on the dictator who, by appropriating
public funds, adversely affects the economy.3
The second research question motivating this study concerns the longevity of
dictatorships. Scholars have proposed different mechanisms addressing this puzzle,
including collective action problems among dissenters (Kuran 1995, Lohmann 1994,
Acemoglu et al. 2004, and Ellis and Fender 2011), repression (Roemer 1985, Ace-
moglu et al. 2010), and politics of cooptation (Wintrobe 1998, Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Sekeris, 2011). Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2001, 2006) and Boix (2003) consider the role of inequality in the stability of
authoritarian regimes. While some of our findings resemble theirs, our respective
settings differ substantially. More specifically, we derive equilibria where a dictator
that embezzles public funds is supported by part of the population. Further, we
allow for more general capital distributions.
One of the central findings of our paper according to which a corrupt dictator
may receive support from part of the population at equilibrium is similar to the
conclusions of Padro´ i Miquel (2007) who shows that an ethnic (or societal) group
may support a dictator even though he impoverishes the country and extracts re-
sources from the ethnic group to which he belongs. The mechanism of the latter
paper is labelled the ‘politics of fear’: an ethnic group would rather be ruled by a
corrupt dictator of his own group, than being ruled by a dictator from a different
group who would then implement similarly corrupt policies slightly tilted in favour
of the opposing ethnic group. Despite these similarities, our frameworks are fun-
damentally different since the alternative to the corrupt dictator in our framework
is a well-behaving democratic regime. Intrestingly, the elites in our framework may
support the corrupt dictator despite the fact that he does not provide them any
special benefits. Moreover, we argue that the channel exlaining the support to the
corrupt dictator goes through inequality, thereby identifying the detrimental effect
inequality on the stability of democracies.
3The adverse effect of corruption on the economy has been theoretically and empirically estab-
lished (Mauro 1995, 1998; Gupta et al. 1998).
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Empirical Evidence
The empirical literature on the impact of political institutions on economic growth
is rich and controversial. Early on, Limongi and Przeworski (1993) claimed that the
very correlation between the degree of democratization and economic growth could
not be clearly established. Similarly, Gehlbach and Keefer (2011) relying on descrip-
tive statistics do not find statistically significant differences between the two types
of regimes in matters of private investments. Mulligan et al. (2004) concluded that
no systematic differences in matters of economic policies could be discerned between
democratic and authoritarian regimes. Two recent studies show a positive impact
of democracy on growth (Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008, Persson and Tabellini
2009), while Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) show that democratic regimes hamper
capital accumulation and reduce economic growth. Finally, Barro (1996) discerns a
non-linear relationship between regime type and economic growth, with dictatorships
being associated with intermediate growth rates. In a recent contribution to the de-
bate, Flachaire et al. (forthcoming) establish the existence of two growth regimes,
where countries featuring strong (weak) political institutions belong to the low (high)
growth group, and their level of economic institutions improves highly (lowly) the
growth rate inside the particular growth regime.
Earlier work by Perotti (1996) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) has empirically
established the detrimental effect of wealth inequality on growth, mainly because of
the political instability generated by inequality. Our theory suggests that inequality
is beneficial for growth in an autocratic regime. In order to empiricaly support our
theory, we also provide evidence that (i) among countries experiencing a democratic
transition, the higher the inequality levels, the lower the growth rates of the economy,
while we equally show that (ii) autocracies featuring higher wealth inequality produce
higher growth rates. Whereas the causal link between regime type and growth rate
is not clearly identified in our estimations, these findings do strongly support our
theoretical findings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal
theoretical model. Section 3 discusses about the link between capital distribution and
the support for a dictatorship. In Section 4 we present empirical findings supporting
our theory. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an endogenous growth model where the regime type can either be a democ-
racy or a dictatorship. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial endowments of
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capital and labor. If the regime is democratic, then the median voter is determining
the tax rate and thus implicitly the growth rate of the economy. If the economy is
ran by a dictator, then the dictator is determining both the tax rate of the economy
and the amount of rents that he extracts from the economy. Under both regimes,
we assume proportional taxation.4 Except for the decision-maker’s personal charac-
teristics, we are thus assuming that the only difference between a democracy and a
dictatorship lies in the (in)ability of the (former) latter to appropriate public funds.
The regime type in our model is endogenous and depends on the citizen’s support
for democracy and dictatorship, respectively. Throughout the analysis we follow
Acemoglu et al. (2010) in conceiving Democracy as an absorbing state. In the
following sections, the structure of the economy is described under both regimes and
by comparing them, we derive the implications for the growth rate of the economy
and for the endogenous survival of dictatorships which is directly linked to the societal
groups that support one regime versus the other.
2.1 Firms
In every time period, there is a number of j identical firms, producing the final good
of the economy. Capital and labor are employed as the primary factors of production.
Following Barro (1990) it is assumed that production is further enhanced by public
services, Gt, and in addition non-diminishing returns to capital and public services
together are assumed, thereby allowing for endogenous growth. Thus, the production
function of the representative firm j, is given by
Yjt(Kjt, Lj) = AtK
a
jtL
1−a
jt G
1−a
t , (1)
where At is a technological parameter and Gt is the public good provided by the
ruler which is financed by taxing individuals in the economy at the rate τ . To save
on notation and given that firms are identical, the j subscript is assumed away and
similarly the time subscript. In particular
G = θτK. (2)
To finance the public good, the ruler taxes proportionally the capital owners
at a flat rate τ and the budget is balanced in every time period. If the regime is
democratic, it is assumed that the entire tax proceeds are devoted to the provision
4The proportional tax assumption is imposed for the model’s parsimony. Had we allowed the
ruler under dictatorship to tax in a lump-sum manner, the dictator would certainly adopt a more
kleptocratic attitude than in the equlibria we derive in this paper.
7
of the public good. If, however the economy is ruled by a dictator, he extracts a
share (1 − θ) of the tax revenue, and therefore θτK denotes the remaining fraction
of the revenue that is allocated to the provision of the public good.5
Factor markets are competitive and therefore individuals are remunerated for
their productive factors at the market prices w and rt, as derived by the following
optimization of the firm
max
K,L
AKaL1−aG1−a (3)
which yields
r = aAka−1G1−a = aAθ1−aτ 1−a ≡ r(τ, θ) (4)
and
w = (1− a)AkaG1−a = (1− a)A(τθ)1−ak = ω(τ, θ) (5)
after replacing for equation (2). Note that kt = Kt/Lt denotes the per capita
capital on the economy. It is also assumed that the aggregate labor endowment in
the economy is constant and normalized to unity. The economy’s capital and labor
income is given by,
yk = (r − τ)k = (aAθ1−aτ 1−a − τ)k (6)
and
yL = y − rk = (1− a)A(τθ)1−ak (7)
where the income from capital, yk, is the income net of taxes and ys is the
income from labor. Note that once spending on the public good is accounted for,
then the marginal product of capital, r, is independent from the capital stock thereby
excluding the possibility of diminishing returns to capital. In addition, the marginal
product of both capital and labor is increasing both in the tax rate τ and decreasing
in the extraction rate 1 − θ (increasing in θ), due to the increase in government
spending for any given level of k.
In a democratic regime, a tax on capital affects directly the return to capital
and therefore affects the incentives of individuals to accumulate wealth. In a dic-
tatorial regime, a tax on capital has the same effect and additionally the incentive
5This assumption captures the institutional gap distinguishing democracies from non-
democracies, as largely emphasized by the literature. More importantly, by relaxing this assumption
and allowing for the possibility of a corrupt democratic regime, would further reinforce our main
findings associated with the support of the dictatorship by different societal groups.
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to accumulate capital is adversely affected by the extraction rate of the dictator,
1 − θ. Similarly, under both regimes a tax on capital is increasing wage income
via increases on public good that increase workers’ productivity, whereas under a
dictatorial regime the extraction rate is adversely affecting the level of wages due to
decreases on the level of public good provided.
The national income identity is thus derived by eqs. (2), (6) and (7),
yk + yL + τk = y (8)
where τk is the total revenue from taxes in a democratic regime. In a dictatorial
regime it could be more analytically expressed as τk = τθk + (1 − θ)τk, where the
first term of the RHS denotes the part of the revenue that is directed to the provision
of the public good and the second term of the RHS denotes the income extracted by
the dictator.
2.2 Individuals
There is a continuum of infinitely lived individuals, whose preferences are defined over
consumption. Individuals differ only in their initial capital and labor endowment,
and can thus be indexed according to their relative factor endowment, σi, defined as
σi =
Li
Ki/K
where σi ∈ [0,∞), (9)
where K is the aggregate capital stock of the economy. Capital rich individuals
are designated by a low value of σi whereas poorly endowed individual (in capital),
are designated by a high value of σi.
Individuals earn income both from labor and capital. Therefore, from eqs. (6)
and (7) the income of an individual i is given by,
yKi + yLi = (r(τ, θ)− τ)Ki + ω(τ, θ)Kiσi.
Individuals maximize their intertemporal consumption,
max
ci,Ki
∞∫
0
log(ci)e
−ρtdt (10)
s.t
k˙ = (r(τ, θ)− τ)ki + ω(τ, θ)kiσi − ci (11)
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where ci denotes consumption and ρ is the discount rate. Formulating the asso-
ciating Hamiltonian and optimizing w.r.t ci and Ki yields the following optimality
condition,
γc =
c˙
c
= r(τ, θ)− ρ− τ. (12)
2.3 The Growth Rate of the Economy
From eq. (12) and assuming the constancy of τ over time, it is implied that γc =
γk = r(τ, θ) − ρ − τ ≡ γ(τ, θ), i.e. all individuals accumulate at the same rate and
therefore the growth rate of the economy as a whole is given by,
γ = aAθ1−aτ 1−a − ρ− τ. (13)
A direct implication of this is that the relative factor endowment, σi will remain
unchanged over time and therefore this implies that the median voter, which will be
introduced in the following section in the context of a democratic regime, remains
unchanged over time.
Consistent with the Alesina and Rodrik’s (1994) prediction, the growth maximiz-
ing tax rate is obtained as,
{τ ∗} = arg max γ
τ
=
(
aA(1− a)θ1−a)1/a (14)
thereby implying that,
γτ R 0 iff τ Q
(
aA(1− a)θ1−a)1/a .
For low tax rates, the beneficial effect of the public good on productivity is the
dominating effect and therefore the growth rate of the economy increases in the tax
rate. However, after a critical threshold, further increases in the tax rate distort the
incentives to accumulate capital and ultimately the growth rate decreases.
Importantly, whereas in the context of a democratic regime the growth rate is
affected only by the tax rate, in a dictatorial regime the incentive of individuals
to accumulate capital is adversely affected by the extraction rate, 1 − θ (positively
affected by θ). In particular,
γθ > 0,
thereby implying that after taxes have been collected, the appropriation of public
funds by a dictator will hamper the productivity-enhancing effect of public good
provision. While this is an anticipated outcome, as will be argued later, it will have
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major implications on determining the societal groups that would favor a dictator as
opposed to a democratic regime.
2.4 Tax Rate in a Democratic Regime
Having assumed that democracy is an absorbing state, we begin by deriving the
economic equilibrium under such regime. Elections over tax rates are held in each
time period and therefore the tax rate is determined by a simple majoritarian rule.6
As already argued it is also assumed that under a well functioning democracy, the
ruler cannot appropriate public funds and therefore θ = 1.7
Given that individuals differ in their initial endowments, the problem that the
government has to solve is to find the optimal τ that maximizes i’s intertemporal
utility. From eqs. (10) and (13) it is inferred that along the optimal growth path
the instantaneous consumption of an agent i, is
c∗i = [ω(τ, θ)σi + r(τ, θ)− τ ]k∗i = [ω(τ, θ)σi + ρ]k∗i (15)
thereby implying that only a fraction, ρ, of his capital stock, k∗i , is consumed on
top of his income from labor ω(τ, θ)σk∗i .
Therefore, the ruler in a democratic regime maximizes the following intertemporal
utility,
max
τ
Ui = max
τ
∞∫
0
log(ci)e
−ρtdt (16)
s.t
c∗i = [ω(τ, θ)σi + ρ]k
∗
i (17)
and
k˙i = k˙ = γ(τ, θ) (18)
6It is worth noting that allowing for elections to be held on a continuous basis amounts to
considering a perfectly functioning democracy that would continuously discipline its elected officials.
Moreover, should an alternative scenario be considered where elections are being held at constant
time intervals, the outcome of the voting process would have been identical.
7It should be noted that since the ruler is not explicitly modeled, and it is assumed that he acts
as a social planner, the optimal rate of θ that would have been chosen by the social planner would
endogenously had been set to θ = 1.
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Given the constant growth rate of the economy as derived in (13), and the con-
sumption along the optimal path in eq. (15), eq. (16) can be expressed as a function
of the initial endowment of capital for agent i, ki0,
max
τ
Ui = max
τ
∞∫
0
log
[
(ω(τ, θ)σi + ρ)k
γ(τ,θ)t
i0
]
e−ρtdt (19)
The tax rate that will be chosen by the ruler will not only affect the level of
consumption but also the growth rate of the economy. Solving the optimization
problem yields the following inequality (which holds with equality at optimality),
which implicitly defines the preferred tax rate of individual i,
τi[1− aA(1− a)(τiθ)−a] ≤ ρ(1− a)vi (20)
where vi = ω(τ, θ)σi/(ω(τ, θ)σi+ρ). Importantly, as is evident from eq. (20), the
implicit tax rate is independent of time and therefore is constant over time. It can
be easily proved that there exists a unique τi and that the single crossing property
is verified, thus implying that the median voter theorem is satisfied (see Appendix).
Therefore if m designates the median voter, who is described by his factor en-
dowment σm, then the tax rate that would be preferred by the median voter would
be implicitly determined by
τm[1− aA(1− a)(τm)−a] ≤ ρ(1− a)vm. (21)
Importantly, given the constancy of the preferred tax rate over time, the same
tax rate will be chosen in every time period. As a consequence, the distribution of
individuals with respect to their initial factor endowments will remain unaffected,
hence implying that the same individual will remain the median voter across time.
2.5 Tax Rate in a Dictatorial Regime
We now extend the analysis to a dictatorial regime so as to compare on the one hand
the economic outcomes under both regimes, and, on the other hand, to bring into
the picture the endogenous survival of dictatorships.
In a dictatorial regime the ruler is a self-interested dictator who owns in period
t a fraction βt of the total amount of capital of the economy,
kdt = βtkt where β ∈ [0, 1].
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The dictator owns no labor and has two sources of income. The first source are
the rents from his capital, whereas his second source of income are the rents that he
extracts from the total tax revenue, (1− θd)τdk. Therefore in every time period the
dictator determines the tax rate τd that he will impose on capital as well as the share,
1− θd, of the tax proceeds that he will appropriate and consume. We assume that a
dictator faces some probability of survival p(τd, θd) which is increasing in the support
received by the dictator. It thus follows that ∂p(τd, θd)/∂θd > 0, while for any θd,
there exists a τˆ such that ∂p(τd, θd)/∂τd ≥ 0 if τd < τˆ , and p(τd, θd) = 0 otherwise.
Indeed, since the single-crossing property for the tax rate is verified for any θd (see
Appendix), it follows that for any θd the support to the dictator is strictly increasing
in τd for τd < τˆ , where τˆ is the threshold value of τd above which all citizens prefer
the democratic regime to the dictatorship. The survival probability equally depends
on a series of modelled parameters (distribution of σi, β), as well as unmodelled
parameters (strength of the army, organizational capacity of the opposition, terrain,
etc. . . ). We shall assume that if the dictator is deposed, the regime permanently
switches to democracy.
The dictator maximizes his utility as described by,
max
τd,θd
Ui = p(τd, θd)
∞∫
0
log(cd)e
−ρtdt+ (1− p(τd, θd))V˜d (22)
s.t
c∗d = [ρβ + (1− θd)τd]k∗ (23)
and
k˙ = γ(τd, θd) = aAθ
1−a
d τ
1−a
d − ρ− τd (24)
where cd denotes the consumption of the dictator under dictatorship, whereas V˜d
stands for the dictator’s discounted life-time indirect utility under democracy. Two
issues should be noted. First, as implied by eq. (23), along the optimal path under
dictatorship, the dictator consumes a fraction (1 − θd) of the total tax revenue, as
well as a fraction of his capital stock, ρβk∗. Eq. (24) implies that under dictatorship
the ruler makes his policy choice by acknowledging that his policy is also affecting
the growth rate of the economy. It should also be noted that the growth rate of the
economy under a dictatorial regime is the one derived in eq. (13) with the difference
being that the tax rate, τd, and the extraction rate, θd, are now being determined by
the dictator.
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Given the constancy of the growth rate of the economy as described in eq. (24),
and given the consumption of the dictator along the optimal path in eq. (23), eq. (22)
can be expressed as a function of the initial endowment of capital in the economy,
k0,
max
τd,θd
Ud = p(τd, θd)
∞∫
0
log
[
(ρβ + (1− θd)τd)kγ(τd,θd)t0 )
]
e−ρtdt+ (1− p(τd, θd))V˜d (25)
s.t. p(τd, θd) ∈ [0, 1]
Differentiating w.r.t. to τd and θd yields the following first order conditions:
∂Ud
∂τd
= p(τd, θd)
[
(1− θd)
(ρβ + (1− θd)τd) ρ +
∂γ(τd, θd)/∂τd
ρ2
]
+
∂p(τd, θd)
∂τd
 ∞∫
0
log
[
(ρβ + (1− θd)τd)kγ(τd,θd)t0
]
e−ρtdt− V˜d
 ≥ 0 (26)
and
∂Ud
∂θd
= p(τd, θd)
[ −τd
(ρβ + (1− θd)τd) ρ +
∂γ(τd, θd)/∂θd
ρ2
]
+
∂p(τd, θd)
∂θd
 ∞∫
0
log
[
(ρβ + (1− θd)τd)kγ(τd,θd)t0
]
e−ρtdt− V˜d
 ≥ 0 (27)
Power-secure dictatorships
We first consider the case where the values of τd and θd that make inequalities (26)
and (27) hold with equality are such the that constraint on p(τd, θd) is binding, and
we denote these optimal values by τ ∗d and θ
∗
d, respectively. In other words, we first
solve for the problem when p(τd, θd) = 1 and
∂p(τd,θd)
∂τd
= ∂p(τd,θd)
∂θd
= 0.8 The dictator
8The aim of this approach is to provide a simplifying exposition as to how the policy of the
dictator will be affected in case his is power insecure. Therefore whereas we will not, for analytical
convenience, lay emphasis on the specific conditions giving rise to such equilibria, we argue that
they are more likely to obtain when the dictator’s survival probability is highly sensitive to the
support of few capital-rich citizens, when the capital endowments in the economy is highly skewed,
when the dictator owns much capital, and when the dissenters’ capacity to oppose the ruler is
hampered by features such as collective action problems, religious and/or ethnic fractionalization,
or the faithfulness of the military to the central regime.
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will then implement his first-best policy and still be power-secure. Combining eqs
(26) and (27) after setting p(τd, θd) = 1 and
∂p(τd,θd)
∂τd
= ∂p(τd,θd)
∂θd
= 0, the following
expression is derived,
τd(1− a(1− a)Aτ−ad θ−ad ) = 0 (28)
Before deriving the explicit formulas for τ ∗d and θ
∗
d, it is worth noting that for eq.
(28) to hold, then
τ ∗d =
(a(1− a)A)1/a
θ∗d
thereby suggesting a complementarity between the decision of the dictator on the
tax rate of the economy and the extraction rate. A higher tax rate, τd, that hinders
growth, and therefore reduces the dictator’s income from capital rents, gives him the
incentives to extract more from the tax revenue to maximize his consumption. On
the other hand, a lower tax rate that boosts growth, increases rents from capital,
and therefore the dictator has less incentives to extract rents from the economy.
Consistently with the above rationale, his incentive to extract revenue from the
economy would be equal to zero, i.e. θd = 1, had he chosen the growth maximizing
tax rate. As will be shown in the following paragraph, what ultimately affects his
policy, is the amount of capital the dictator owns.
Eq. (28) implicitly determines the tax rate and the extraction rate imposed by
the dictator. Solving the system of eqs. (26) and (27), and using eq. (28), yields the
explicit formulas for τ ∗d and θ
∗
d, i.e.
τ ∗d = ρ(1− β) + (a(1− a)A)1/a (29)
and
θ∗d =
(a(1− a)A)1/a
ρ(1− β) + (a(1− a)A)1/a
. (30)
Using eqs. (29) and (30), the following Proposition can be deduced.
Proposition 1. When a dictator is power secure,
i) The higher a dictator’s endowment in capital, β, the lower will be the share
of taxes embezzled and the tax rate, thereby yielding a higher growth rate for the
economy.
ii) A dictator owning all the capital, i.e. β = 1, mimics the growth-maximizing
social planner.
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Proof. Part i) follows immediately from differentiating eqs. 29) and (30) w.r.t. β.
while ii) follows from setting β = 1 in eqs. (29) and (30), and then deducing that
τ ∗d = τ
∗, and ϑd = 1.
The result is both intuitive and fundamental. A dictator who owns a negligible
amount of capital, is primarily financing his consumption via extraction. Therefore
he finds it optimal to impose a high tax on the economy’s capital and to extract a
large fraction of the tax proceeds. This course of action does carry for the dictator
an intertemporal trade-off, since he has two instruments to balance the returns from
rent extraction and growth. A low growth rate which is induced by a high tax
rate, can be counterbalanced by higher extraction. Moreover, it should be noted
that the less capital the dictator owns, the less important is this source of income
for his intertemporal consumption and therefore the lower the incentives to adopt
growth-promoting policies.
Conversely, a dictator who owns a large share of the economy’s total capital, and
whose consumption is therefore primarily financed by rents on the capital he owns,
will internalize the adverse effect of extracting a fraction of the tax proceeds on
the level of public good, and will therefore lay more emphasis on growth-enhancing
policies as opposed to rent-seeking decisions. Therefore, such a dictator will choose
a lower tax rate, which will ultimately accelerate the growth rate of the economy.
Pushing the reasoning to the limit where the dictator would be the unique capital
owner of the economy yields the First Best outcome, namely he would have an
incentive to act as a growth-maximizing social planner.
Power-insecure dictators
When the constraint on the survival probability p(τd, θd) is not binding, the dicta-
tor’s optimal policy is twisted away from his most preferred policy in order to attract
more popular support and improve his odds of survival. We shall denote by τ¯d and
θ¯d the optimal decisions of power-insecure dictators. By a revealed-preferences type
of argument, we necessarily have that the second square-bracketed term of (26) and
of (27) is positively valued, since the dictator can always fully replicate the policy of
a democratic regime. As a consequence, the first square-bracketed term of (26) must
be negative. Having shown in the Appendix that the power-secure dictator’s utility
is concave in τ , it follows that the negative sign of the first square-bracketed term in
(26) implies that τ¯d > τ
∗
d .
Consider next Equation (27). For any τ , we know that the support to the dictator
must be increasing in θ. Formally, ∂p(τd, θd)/∂θ > 0. It follows that the first square-
bracketed term of Equation (27) is negative at optimality. Since the utility of the
power-secure dictator is easily shown to be concave in θ, it follows that θ¯d > θ
∗
d.
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Combining the findings on τ¯d and θ¯d, allows us to state the following proposition:
Proposition 2. When a dictator is power-insecure, he adopts more popular poli-
cies to expand his support among citizens. By containing his rent-seeking and by
increasing the tax rate, a power-insecure dictator implements a more redistributive
policy.
2.6 Growth in Democracies and Dictatorships
In this section we compare the growth rates between a democratic and a dictato-
rial regime. This will enable us to identify the societal groups that would back a
dictatorship instead of supporting a democratic regime. Building upon the previous
sections, the following Proposition can be derived.
Proposition 3. i) In a democratic regime, the growth rate associated with the median
voter’s policy is always lower than the growth-maximizing tax rate. In a dictatorial
regime the growth rate associated with the dictator’s policy, is always lower than the
growth rate imposed by a dictator who owns the total capital of the economy.
ii) For any capital endowment of the median voter, km, there always exists a
sufficiently wealthy dictator such that a dictatorship yields a higher growth rate.
Proof. If the dictator is power-secure, part i) follows immediately from setting σi > 0
in eq. (20) given eq. (13) and setting β < 1 in eq. (29) given eq. (24). If the dictator
is power-insecure, the growth rate will necessarily be lower since ∂p(τd, θd)/∂τ > 0
at equilibrium.
To show ii) we simply take the limit of the growth rate induced by the power-
secure dictator when k →∞. Since at the limit the dictator tends to owning all the
capital, he produces the growth-maximizing policy. If the dictator is power-insecure,
since p(0) > 0 at equilibrium, it is necessarily the case that γ∗d > γm, where γm
designates the growth rate under democracy.
In light of the beneficial effect of the public good on productivity, a positive tax
on capital is desirable by all individuals of a democratic society, including individuals
owning no labour (i.e. pure capitalists). If a dictator owns all the economy’s capital,
he will implement a growth maximizing policy provided this leaves him power-secure:
his incentives to retain part of the tax proceeds for himself are annihilated since the
entire tax collection is operated on the dictator’s own capital stock.
Interestingly, once one departs from the limit cases where the median voter is
capital-less and the dictator owns the total capital of the economy then we can
always conceive a sufficiently wealthy dictator that can generate higher growth rates
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than a democracy. The direct implication of this result, as will be shown in the
next section, is that there can exist a fraction of the society that prefers backing a
dictatorship instead of supporting a democratic regime.
2.7 Who Supports a Dictator?
It is generally argued that most dictatorships are being supported by rich elites.
Yet, the common understanding is that these elites are either themselves part of the
government, or to the least receive special favours from the regime. In our setting,
a dictator’s policy maps into support or opposition to the dictatorial regime, and
we are thereby able to shed some light on the characteristics conducive to long-lived
dictatorships on the one hand, and on the ones likely to favour democratic transitions,
on the other hand. In the following Proposition we explore the determinants of a
power-secure dictatorship and we enquire whether the longevity of some dictators
may be explained by the elites’ backing.
Proposition 4. In relatively unequal economies, where the median voter is poorly
endowed in capital, a capital rich secure dictator implements a policy generating a
higher growth rate than under democracy. Consequently, a fraction of capital-rich
individuals is in favour of a dictatorship, thus increasing the regime’s security.
Proof. We first show that the result is valid when σm = ∞, and then relax the
assumption so that the median owns some capital.
When setting σm =∞ and β = 1, we know that γm < γd. As a consequence there
must exist a β¯ < 1 such that γm = γd. Distributing (1−β−)k to agents endowed with
no labour makes them strictly better-off under dictatorship. Moreover, by continuity
there exist positive values of labour endowment still making them better-off under
dictatorship.
Setting β = 1, by continuity there exists a finite σ¯ such that γm = γd. Repro-
ducing the above reasoning implies that Proposition 4 holds for capital-poor median
voters owning strictly positive amounts of capital.
Using the above Proposition, we deduce that there exist distributions of capital
where the dictatorship is preferred by some societal group. Our analysis suggests
that highly unequal societies where ruling elites control a significant part of the
economy’s capital are more prone to the emergence of a long-lived dictatorial regime.
We therefore obtain that since the survival of a dictatorial regime depends on power
derived from riches (i.e. capital) or power derived from masses (i.e. number of
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supporters), under both cases the probability of a dictatorial regime is higher in
more unequal societies.
Whereas the results of this model support the predictions of Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) for relatively equal societies, crucially this is no longer valid as the degree of
inequality increases. Increases in inequality suggest that the prevalence of a demo-
cratic regime is no longer an outcome preferred by all societal groups, thereby leaving
space for the emergence of a dictatorial regime.
Proposition 4 underlines that some citizens would be disposed to totally give up
their voting rights and therefore renege on the very existence of checks and balances
under some circumstances. When scrutinizing this finding, it is fairly immediate:
since both a dictatorship and a democracy yield policies which citizens are unable to
influence on their own (except for the dictator), it is not surprising that capital-rich
individuals would rather see a growth-friendly dictator, while capital-poor individuals
would be in favour of a pro-redistribution ‘dictator’, i.e. the equivalent to a capital-
poor median voter.
Interestingly, in the presence of more equal capital distributions, the support for
dictatorships is reduced, hence making dictatorial regimes power-insecure. In such
situations we demonstrated that the dictator will set higher taxes, will embezzle less
public funds, and will hence implement more redistributive policies so as to improve
his survival odds. Nevertheless, in the presence of a capital-poor median voter, such
a power-insecure dictator will propose policies conducive to higher growth rates than
under a democratic regime.
3 Discussion
The support for the dictator has been shown to depend on the distribution of capital
in the society. First, the more endowed an individual is in capital, the more likely
it is that he supports a growth-friendly dictator. As long as the dictator’s policy
ensures a sufficiently high growth rate, the wealthier capitalists of the society will
support the dictator. Second, the more capital the median voter owns, the lower
the society’s support for a dictatorship. The wealthier the median voter in terms of
capital, the higher the growth rate implemented under democracy, thus eroding the
relative benefits of a dictatorship.
A series of graphs will help visualizing how different distributions of capital map
into the support for a dictatorship. On Figure 1 we draw a Lorenz curve of a
hypothetical society for capital. On the x-axis is therefore represented the cumulative
share of individuals, while on the y-axis lies the cumulative share of capital. This
society is composed of three groups A, B, and C, with increasing capital endowments.
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Notice that the median voter of this economy belongs to the capital-poor group A.
We assume the capital endowment of group C individuals to be such as to make
them slightly prefer a growth-friendly dictator to democracy. Therefore, the rest of
the society strictly prefers democracy. In this society a dictator would be supported
by a share (1− pi2) of individuals owning a share (1− β− κ2) of the economy’s total
capital.
Figure 1:
On Figure 2 we increase the level of inequality of this society by transferring part
of group A’s capital to group B individuals, for them to match group C capital-
endowments. This capital redistribution has two effects. First, it aligns the regime
preferences of group B and group C individuals. Second, it reduces the capital en-
dowment of the median voter, thereby reducing the growth rate under democracy.
As a consequence under this new configuration a share (1−pi1) of the society (or the
owners of share (1− κ′1) of capital) will be pro-dictatorship. While it is speculative
to identify the critical support for the emergence of a dictatorship, an increase of
inequality in capital ownership strengthens the backing of a dictatorship which feeds
back into more power-secure dictatorships, eventually incentivizing dictators to im-
plement even more growth friendly policies. A very unbalanced distribution of wealth
may therefore have favored the emergence of some relatively stable dictatorships (e.g.
the experiences of Chile and Singapore).
In Figure 3, we pool the capital endowments of Groups A and B as given in
Figure 1. This inequality-reducing transfer increases the capital ownership of the
median voter, thereby increasing the growth rate under democracy. Since Group
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Figure 2:
C was weakly preferring dictatorship prior to the transfer, nobody will support the
dictatorship after this transfer. A relatively prosperous middle class characterizing
economically developed societies inhibits the emergence of a pro-dictatorship coali-
tion.
Figure 3:
21
4 Empirical Findings
We now provide empirical support for the theory developed in this manuscript, by
looking at the impact of democratization on economic growth, while accounting for
levels of income inequality, and we then provide evidence that autocracies featuring
higher wealth inequality produce higher growth rates.
We employ the sample of Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) to relate our ar-
gument to the existing empirical literature. The latter paper explores the effect
of democratization on growth, using an index of democratization that captures the
transition from an autocratic regime to a democratic one. The democratization
variable takes the value 0 for autocracies, and if democratization takes place, the
variable takes the unit value. Column 1 of Table 1 partly replicates their analysis
by exploring the effect of democratization on growth. The analysis employs country
and year fixed effects, thereby estimating the effect of democratization on the growth
rate within a particular country. To produce simple correlations that illustrate our
theoretical argument, we introduce in the analysis a control for the level of inequality
(the share of income held by the wealthiest 20% of the population) as well as the
interactive term of inequality and democratization.
The results suggest the following. The coefficient on democratization is posi-
tive, in accordance with the results of Papaioannou and Siourounis, suggesting that
democratization is good for growth. The coefficient of inequality on growth is in-
conclusive, reflecting perhaps the fact that the literature is inconclusive as to direct
effect of inequality on growth. Critically though the sign of the coefficient of the
interactive term is negative and significant. This suggests that after democratization
has taken place, the positive effect of democratization on growth is mitigated by the
presence of inequality.
This is a first sign of evidence towards our hypothesis as to the mediating effect
of inequality. However this approach, i.e. using the democratization measure, does
not allow us to capture the effect of inequality in the context of a non-autocratic
regime, neither to capture the degree of autocracy.
To this end, in Column 2 of Table 1 we use instead the measure of autocracy from
the Polity IV dataset which captures the presence or not of an autocracy as well as
the intensity of the autocratic regime.9 Whereas this is not a direct measure of the
capital endowment of the dictator, it could be used as a proxy under the identifying
assumption that the close circle of elites directly controlling the country (the dictator
and his acolytes) is therefore likely to be wealthy, either because of their endowments,
9In the original dataset, the variable ranges from -10 to +10 in the pre-2000 period, and from 0
to +10 in the post-2000 period. We normalized the index over the whole period on a 0-10 scale.
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or because of the wealth they appropriated on their path to power. Interestingly,
the correlations in Column 2 further illustrate our argument. In particular, the neg-
ative coefficient on the measure of autocracy reflects the partial effect of autocracy
on growth, namely that autocratic regimes are associated with lower growth rates,
a result that accords well with some of the literature mentioned above. The coeffi-
cient on inequality is insignificant, again potentially reflecting the inconclusiveness
of the direct effect. However, the coefficient on the interactive term is positive and
significant. Depending on the degree of inequality, this result yields three differ-
ent conclusions. First, the negative effect of autocracy on economic outcomes is
mitigated by the presence of inequality. Second, the partial effect of inequality on
growth rate is positive in the presence of an autocratic regime. The more autocratic
the regime is, the stronger the positive effect of inequality on the growth rate, a
result that is potentially capturing the fact that in the presence of inequality more
autocratic regimes are choosing more growth-enhancing policies. More importantly,
for sufficiently high values of inequality (e.g. if the income held by the richest 20%
of the population is more than 51% of the total income), then the total effect of
autocracy on growth may become positive.
The above interpretations rely on mere correlations. A carefull empirical analysis,
which is beyond the scope of this paper, would require employing a dynamic panel
analysis and properly addressing potential endogeneity issues. Yet we view these
correlations as first evidence of the fact that inequality is a critical mediating factor
that can affect the stability of a democratic regime by affecting economic activity
and thus the interests of a fraction of the population.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that different societal groups may support a rent-seeking
dictator serving their interests better than the median voter would in a democratic
regime. Importantly, when a dictator’s support base is sufficient to leave him power-
secure, support for a dictator is not granted in exchange of individual benefits (e.g.,
special treatment by the dictator as clients, party members, or military bodies), nor
is it the result of coercion and fear. Wealthy elites are inclined to back an almighty
and long lived dictator because of the growth-promoting policies that are likely to be
implemented. Since this backing and the dictators’ policy are strategic complements,
and both impact on the determination of the equilibrium growth rate, these actions
tend to re-inforce each other and to allow for higher growth rates at equilibrium. The
distribution of capital in the society and the stakes of the dictator in the economy, in
the form of capital ownership, directly shape the preferences of individuals over the
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political system: in societies featuring a high concentration of capital and a dictator
endowed with enough capital, part of the capital owners eager to see the economy
grow value dictatorship more than democracy. We argue that the persistence of some
dictatorships can be rooted in the substantial backing of wealthy capital owners. Less
unequal societies weaken dictators who, faced with increased power insecurity, are
compelled to implement more popular redistributive policies while equally reducing
the embezzlement of public funds for their own consumption. Finally, we show that
the support for a dictator is decreasing with the capital ownership of the median
voter.
A Appendix
Proof of Uniqueness of tax rate, τi
The optimal tax rate is implicitly derived by eq. (20). Setting eq. (20) equal
to zero as implied by the optimality condition, and differentiating with respect to τ,
implies that the objective function is is concave in τ iff
1− aA(1− a)2(τiθ)−a − aA(1− a)
3ρ2σi(τiθ)
−a
[ω(τ, θ)σi + ρ]2
> 0
Rearranging terms, this expression can be written as
[
1− (1− a)ρ
ω(τ, θ)σi + ρ
]
τ [1− aA(1− a)(τiθ)−a] + a2A(1− a)2(τiθ)−a > 0
Since both terms of the expression are positive the inequality is necessarily satis-
fied. It is then straightforward to compute ∂
2U
∂τi∂σi
and to verify that the single crossing
property is verified, thus implying that the median voter theorem applies.
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Table 1: Regime type, inequality, and growth
(1) (2)
Dep. Var: Growth Rate
Democratization (DEM) 15.271**
(7.020)
Autocracy (AUTOC) -1.167*
(0.702)
Inequality -0.005 -0.192
(0.092) (0.112)
Interaction DEMxInequality -0.264**
(0.116)
Interaction AUTOCxInequality 0.023*
(0.013)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 514 514
Countries 129 129
Years 26 26
R-squared 0.113 0.0916
Summary: This table illustrates that the adverse effect of autoc-
racy on growth rates is mitigated in the presence of inequality.
Notes: (i) DEMOC is the index of democratization constructed by Papaioannou
and Siourounis (2008). The index takes the values 0 for autocracies and the value 1 for
a country that moved from autocracy to democracy; (ii) AUTOC is the autocracy index
provided by the Polity dataset. It takes values from 0-10, where 0 indicates democracies
whereas 10 is assigned to the most autocratic regimes; (iii) Inequality is proxied by
the income share held by the highest 20%, a measure provided by the world bank; (iv)
robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level,
all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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